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Abstract 
As massive rural residents leave their home countryside for better employment, 
migration has profound effects on income distributions such as rural-urban income 
gap and inequalities within rural or urban areas. The nature of the effects depend 
crucially on who are migrating and their migrating patterns. In this paper, we 
emphasize two facts. First, rural residents are not homogeneous, they self-select to 
migrate or not. Second, there are significant differences between migrants who 
successfully transformed their hukou status (permanent migrants) and those did not 
(temporary migrants). Using three coordinated CHIP data sets in 2002, we find that 
permanent migrants are positively selected from rural population especially in terms 
of education. As permanent migration takes more mass from the upper half of rural 
income density, both rural income level and inequalities decrease, the urban-rural 
income ratio increases at the same time. On the contrary, the selection effect of 
temporary migrants is almost negligible. It does not have obvious effect on rural 
income level and inequalities.  
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Migration, Self-selection, and Income Distributions: 
Evidence from Rural and Urban China 
 
1. Introduction  
The widening rural-urban income gap and massive migration from rural to urban 
areas are of utmost concerns for researchers and policy makers nowadays.1 Migration 
is obviously the consequence of the income gap, and is often regarded as a way to 
reduce it as rural population leave for a better paid job in urban areas. The reverse 
direction of causality, however, is neglected. Migration can also serve as reason of 
widening rural-urban income gap. The reason is simple: the rural population is not 
homogeneous, they self-select to migrate or not. Whether migration reduces the gap 
or not, to large extent, depends on who are migrating and their migrating patterns. In 
particular, if the rural migrants are mainly composed of those who are more able and 
more educated (“positively” selected), and if they are well integrated in the urban 
labor market, the gap will probably augment. The reverse will probably be true if the 
migrants are randomly chosen from the rural population.  
The role of self-selection in migration is not only at the heart of the income gap, 
but also critical for us to understand the income distributions within these two regions. 
Consider the rural areas first. If the migrants are randomly chosen from the population, 
the income distribution of the stayers will remain unchanged under the assumption 
that the skill price is unchanged. But the shape of it will probably change if the 
migrants are not randomly chosen under the same assumption. 2 The characteristics 
of the migrants also have strong influences on the income distributions of urban 
residents as well. Inequality will increase if the migrants are “negatively” selected.3 
In this article, however, we put more emphasize on the distribution of income in rural 
                                                        
1 The ratio of per captia annual income between those of urban and rural areas is 2.2:1 in 1990, and by 2004, the 
ratio increased sharply to 3.2:1 (NBS, 2005), and see Li and Yue (2004) for reference. During this period, rural to 
urban migration also increased. According to MOA (the Ministry of Agriculture) source, the number of rural 
migrants soared from 2 million in 1982 to 102 million in 2004. (Cai and Wang, 2007) 
2 This is a strong assumption of course. When some rural residents migrate out, the skill price may also change in 
equilibrium, especially when the skill distribution changed in case of positive selection. But we need this 
assumption to construct our counterfactual income distribution. This kind of assumption is also used by Dinardo, 
Fortin, and Lemieux’s (1996) and Chiquiar and Hanson (2002). 
3 See Borjas (1987, 1999) for a discussion of self-selection in an international migration context, and for a 
comprehensive survey. 
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areas. 
Although much of the research have been done to investigate the role of 
migration on inequality (Li, 1999) and poverty reduction (Wang and Cai, 2006), one 
basic question has yet to be answered: “how much would a migrant have been paid in 
her/his home villages were he/she stayed home?” This question is fundamentally very 
important for our purpose. For example, when we study the influence of migration on 
income distribution within rural areas, we are in essence carrying out a 
factual-counterfactual comparison. The factual is just what we observed for rural 
stayers. But in order to construct the counterfactual, we must include migrant workers 
in our rural sample because they would be working in rural areas if they don’t migrate. 
And what we are interested in is their counterfactual income instead of their actual 
income in urban areas. The same logic applies when we study rural-urban income gap. 
The factual is just what we observed for rural stayers and urban workers including 
migrants, especially permanent migrants. But in order to construct counterfactual, we 
should know the migrants’ income in rural areas if they don’t migrate. 
We modify Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux’s (1996) framework to construct 
counterfactual income densities. We begin with rural residents’ actual income density, 
which corresponds to rural areas’ income structure integrated over the distribution of 
rural-worker characteristics. Then we re-weight this distribution according to the 
observed characteristics of all migrants. This simulates the wage distribution that 
would prevail given migrant characteristics and rural skill prices.  
In this paper, we use three coordinated data sets from the 2002 China Household 
Income Project (henceforth CHIP, see the data section for a brief introduction) to 
examine who in rural areas migrates to the urban areas and how their observable skills 
and incomes compare to those who remain at home. Another feature of this article is 
that we make distinction between two types of migrants: temporary migrants and 
permanent migrants. We refer permanent migrants to those who successfully got 
urban hukou and temporary the ones did not. Both descriptive statistics and formal 
analytical results indicate that this distinction is essential for us to understand the 
effect of migration on income distribution both within and between rural and urban 
areas. The permanent migrants are rather selective than temporary migrants. They are 
more educated, and they migrate to urban areas for both higher level of wages and for 
higher skill prices. Were they stayed in rural areas, they will fall disproportionately on 
the medium-to-upper part of the income distributions. These results are consistent 
with the findings on the changing patterns of China’s income distribution by Li and 
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Yue (2004) and many others, which indicate that the rural-urban income gap enlarged 
and that the income distribution within rural areas decreased slightly. We also find an 
obvious composition change of the permanent migrants.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some institutional 
backgrounds and a brief literature review. Section 3 introduces and describes our data. 
Section 4 first gives the methodology we use to construct the counterfactual income 
distribution and then gives the empirical results. Section 5 investigates the effect of 
migration on rural income distributions and rural-urban income gap. The last section 
concludes. 
2. Background and Brief Literature Review 
Several articles give excellent introduction and analysis on the institutional 
background of China’s rural-urban migration, in particular the Hukou system (see for 
example Zhao (2005), Deng and Gustafsson (2006), Wang and Cai (2006)). Basically, 
rural migrants can be divided into two groups, those obtained an urban hukou and 
those did not. Only those obtained an urban hukou are registered officially as urban 
residents, and the urban hukou is a prerequisite for them to be covered by the urban 
social security system and to have various forms of welfare and subsidies.4 Moreover, 
once they are registered as urban residents, they are no longer rural residents, their 
land in sending regions will no longer belong to them, and officially they are no 
longer villagers and have no voting right any more on village affairs. Both casual 
observation and academic research (Deng and Gustafsson, 2006 for example) indicate 
that rural migrants who successfully obtain an urban hukou are well integrated in 
urban society. On the other hand, many rural migrants retain their rural hukou, they 
still have land and have political right in their village affairs. Although they may 
spend quite a long time in urban areas, they are not covered by the urban social 
security system and are not entitled to various subsidies. 
Many researches examine the migrant characteristics and compare them with 
those in the destination and origins. Basically speaking, the rural migrants are more 
educated than the non-migrants and tend to be younger. Majority of them have junior 
middle school or primary school education. There are fewer female migrants. 
Minority nationalities are less likely to migrate. (see Zhao (2005) for a more 
comprehensive survey). However, most of the existing literature is on temporary 
                                                        
4 We’ll give more detailed institutional background information in the data section. 
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migrants, those who migrate to urban labor market without obtaining the urban hukou. 
The others, who successfully obtained the urban hukou, are largely neglected (Deng 
and Gustafsson (2006) is among a few exceptions). We’ll see that these two groups of 
migrants are different in many aspects from individual characteristics to labor market 
outcomes. Therefore, neglecting permanent migrants will bias our understanding of 
the role of migration on income distributions. In this article, we contribute to the 
literature by looking on a more representative sample of migrants. 
Second, due to the methodology and/or the data limitation, most of the above 
researches focus on means or a particular position (the poor whose incomes are below 
a certain level, for example) of the income distribution. Many researchers examine the 
effects of migration on poverty, emphasizing the role of remittance (Li (1999), and 
Du, et. al (2005) for example).5 However, the evidence on the effects of migration on 
the entire income distribution, not just on poverty, is still limited. We still don’t know 
what the shape of income distribution in rural areas would be like if the migrant 
workers stayed home. Moreover, although we have the attributes of those migrants, 
we don’t know the position of the income distribution where they would fall in if they 
stayed home. To accomplish the above tasks, we use DFL approach. This approach 
was introduced by Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), and has been widely used.6  
It should be noted that the DFL is not the only approach to construct the 
counterfactuals. Researchers using Oaxaca (1973)’s approach to decompose the 
income differentials must also be familiar with the “counterfactual” concept. Oaxaca 
decompositions are based on simple counterfactuals such as “how much would a 
migrant with the mean characteristics of all migrants have been paid in rural area”. 
What distinguish DFL approach to Oaxaca approach is that the latter focus on means 
alone and the former works with the entire distribution. Only focusing on means will 
conceal much information, and it is possible that the means remain unchanged while 
the distribution changed. DFL approach can give us information exactly on where the 
income distribution was influenced most by migration. Another notable alternative is 
the method proposed by Machado and Mata (2005), which can also be used to 
                                                        
5 Du, et. al (2005), find that households with migrant(s) have higher household income per capita by about 8.5 to 
13.1 percent on average compared with those without migrants, but the impact on poverty is small because most of 
the poor do not migrate. They also find that migrants remit a large share of incomes and are somewhat responsive 
to the needs of other family members. In a somewhat earlier research, Li (1999) finds that remittance play a 
significant role in the per capita income of migrant households. 
6 For example, Lemieux (2006) extended the DFL to decompose the change of residual inequality into price effect 
and composition effect. Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) analyzed the self-select effect of migration from Mexico to 
the U.S.  
6 
construct the whole counterfactual distribution. This method is based on “parametric 
model for the quantiles of the conditional distribution.” To construct the 
counterfactuals, they “resort to resampling procedures to obtain a marginal 
distribution consistent with both the conditional model and the covariate densities.” 
Clearly, because of resorting to a parametric model, the MM approach is necessarily 
restrictive. The resampling procedures may also be quite cumbersome. In contrast, the 
DFL approach is based on non-parametric kernel-density method. It’s not as 
restrictive, and it’s easy to implement.  
In fact, these two approaches are conceptually similar. Researches using these 
two approaches haven’t found that either one is superior to the other. One notable 
research is Autor, Katz, and Kearny (2005). They extended the MM approach to 
investigate composition effect and price effect in the change of wage inequality. To 
compare their results to Lemieux (2005), they find its substantive differences with the 
latter are not consequential for their conclusions (They do draw different conclusions, 
but not because of different methods). But in our context, the DFL re-weighting 
method is more readily used to calculate counterfactual inequality, and it’s easy to 
modify this method to account for labor participation differential. Therefore, we use 
the DFL approach only. 
Finally, self-selection in the process of migration and its effects on income 
distributions are well studied (especially for the US). The foci are on the effect of 
immigration on inequality within US (see Borjas, 1987, 1999). The analytical 
framework of self-selection largely based on Roy’s (1951) model developed in the 
international migration literature is very instructive for Chinese studies. As pointed 
out by Foster and Rosenzweig (2007), “the selectivity of the process in terms of the 
human capital of those who leave the agricultural sector” is still less studied for 
developing countries. This paper adds empirical results to this literature.  
3. Data and summary statistics 
The data comes from the 2002 China Household Income Survey (CHIP) which was 
conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in joint work with the National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in the beginning of 2003. There are three coordinated 
datasets, namely, urban household survey, rural household survey, and urban migrants 
survey.  
The urban household survey covers 2 municipalities and 10 provinces. It collects 
information for 6835 households in 77 cities. The rural survey covers rural 
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households in 22 provincial level units comprising 122 counties or towns from which 
9200 households were selected. It should be noted that the sample frame for both the 
rural and urban sample is based on registers of people possessing a local hukou. 
Meanwhile, both the urban and rural samples were drawn from larger samples 
regularly used by NBS to produce official statistics for China. Therefore, the data we 
use is representative of China (see Deng and Gustafsson, 2006, and Li, et al, 2006). It 
should also be noted that most of the information we use is at individual level. There 
are 20632 urban individuals and 37969 rural individuals, 35.21% and 64.79% of the 
whole sample respectively. The percentage is very close to the figures given by NBS 
(2005), 39.09% and 60.91%. 7 
3.1 Two samples of temporary migrants 
For the study of rural-to-urban migration, a migrant survey was also conducted. 
It covers 5327 individuals in 2000 migrant households living in the same 
municipalities and provinces as the survey of urban residents. However, this data set 
has at least two shortcomings for our study. First, it doesn’t include permanent 
migrants as all the individuals have rural hukou. Second, the sample may be more 
representative of temporary migrants with longer migration duration. This 
representativeness bias is due to the sampling process of the CHIP migrant survey. As 
Deng and Gustafsson (2006) commented on this data set, “Short term rural migrants 
living in dormitories and/or at urban work places are rather difficult to identify, while 
rural migrants with housing conditions similar to the registered urban population can 
be simpler to identify and sample, our sample of temporary migrants has this 
character”.  
To overcome the second shortcoming, we identify another set of temporary 
migrants using the Rural Household Survey. In the 2002 rural survey, there’re around 
3800 rural residents earn wages outside their home countryside out of 37969 rural 
residents. These migrants are also called temporary migrants in this paper. However, 
this temporary migrants sample also has representativeness problems. First, it’s 
difficult to tell whether these migrants are to other rural areas or to urban areas. 
Second, the migrants sample from the rural household survey may be under 
                                                        
7 The fact that the rural and urban samples are representative of the national population is import for our analysis 
when constructing the counterfactual wage densities. We are lucky that our sample seems representative. To be 
assure that our results are robust to this problem, we also do exercises to adjust our sample size. We drop 
observations randomly from the urban survey, so that the shares are exactly as given by NBS. The results didn’t 
change much. 
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representative of the migrants who move out for a longer period of time and those 
who migrate out with the whole family.  
Fortunately, although both these two temporary migrant samples have 
representativeness problems, the biases are in opposite directions. Therefore, they can 
complement each other. As these two datasets are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
we consider these two temporary migrants samples separately. And for convenience, 
we sometimes called the temporary migrants from the urban migrants survey type I 
migrants, and those from the rural household survey type II migrants. We’ll compare 
the characteristics and income distributions of the temporary migrants with other 
groups later on. Next, we construct our sample of permanent migrants (type III 
migrants).  
3.2 Identifying permanent migrants 
In the 2002 urban survey, the urban residents were asked “when did you get the urban 
hukou?” Those who answered this question with a specific year were former rural 
residents, and successfully obtained urban hukou. Therefore, this piece of information 
helps us to identify the permanent migrants. From Table 1, we can see that around 
20% urban residents were not born with urban hukou, among which over one half 
obtained their urban hukou within the last two decades, which is consistent with the 
fact that the hukou system has become less restrictive in the post-reform period.  
(Insert table 1 around here) 
It’s also helpful for us to investigate the ways by which the former rural residents 
obtained their urban hukou. We can categorize the different ways into two groups: 
those obtaining urban hukou through formal ways (through education, through being a 
cadre,8 or through joining PLA), and those through informal ways (through buying 
house or through “losing land”9). Rural residents, whose lands are occupied by urban 
construction projects are often given urban hukou. Rural households who can afford 
buying houses in urban areas are also sometimes given urban hukou. It should be 
noted that, the CHIP data are poor at collecting this information. Nearly half of the 
permanent migrants didn’t report the specific ways how they obtained the urban 
                                                        
8 The “cadre” here refers to those who are in charge of some administrative affairs in villages or towns. They are 
generally rural residents. But these people can be promoted. Once they are promoted, they have chances of getting 
urban hukou. 
9 Those obtained their urban hukou simply because their land are occupied do not necessarily move. We 
categorize them as permanent migrants in the sense of hukou status transformation. We’ll come back to this 
problem later. 
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hukou (other or missing, see Table 1). Consider only those who did report. It can be 
shown that majority of them got urban hukou through formal education. Joining the 
PLA is the second largest channel. The last two informal channels take up a relatively 
small share of the permanent migrant population.  
The above different channels played different roles in different time of periods. 
Three aspects are noteworthy. First, higher education plays a predominant role in most 
of the time periods. For those obtained urban hukou in the 1980s in particular, above 
30% of the them were through the way of education. Even during the 1960s, when 
joining PLA is the major channel of getting urban hukou, there’re still more than 18% 
of the permanent migrants obtaining their hukou by education. Second, in the 
post-reform periods, neither being a cadre nor joining PLA are playing a significant 
role in the permanent migration process. Third, there are some new trends in the 
1990s. It seems that more and more rural residents buying houses in urban areas. 
Many local governments offer them urban hukou in order to encourage rural residents 
to buy houses and therefore raise government revenue. There also seems to be more 
and more rural residents get their urban hukou after their lands are occupied. These 
two groups enlarged tremendously in the 1990s. In the 1970s, only less than 5% of the 
migrants get their urban hukou through these two channels, in the 1990s however, the 
share increased to more than 20%. 
The characteristics of the permanent migrants are closely related to how and 
when they obtained urban hukou (see Table A 1 in the appendix). There’s no doubt that 
those who obtained their urban hukou through formal education have the highest 
years of schooling. Those through being a cadre or through joining PLA have 
relatively fewer years of schooling. Migrants with the lowest level of education are 
those through informal ways. Meanwhile, the average years of schooling increased 
steadily from 7.4 for the “-1950” migration cohort to 11.4 for the “1980-90” migration 
cohort. This increasing trend reflects partly the fact of education expansion. 
Interestingly, this trend stopped for the “1990-” cohort. This was probably caused by 
the composition change of permanent migrants as mentioned above. 
Consider age structure. Those who obtained hukou through education, through 
being a cadre, and through joining PLA were relatively young when they migrated. 
The ages of those who obtain hukou through losing land, or through buying house are 
not only higher but also with more dispersions. In 2002 (when the survey was 
conducted), the subgroups with the highest average ages are “cadre” and “army” (53.7 
and 53.0 respectively), and that with the lowest average age is “land”. This contrast 
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reflects the fact that most of those belonging to “cadre” and “army” groups obtained 
their hukou before 1980, while “losing land” is a rather recent phenomenon. 
These simple description statistics reminds us that, even within the group, 
permanent migrants themselves are not homogenous. It’s obvious that permanent 
migration is driven by different forces and under different institutional constraints. 
This largely reflects China’s feature of development and transition. Therefore, it’s 
important to investigate the cohort effects in the following analysis. We thus divide 
our samples into different groups in the main empirical part according to the year 
when the migrants obtained their urban hukou. To account for the effects of some 
historical events in the transitional process, we do not divide the sample by decades as 
in this section but by some critical years. Those who obtained their hukou after 1992 
are termed as recent migrants.10 The recent migrants are of more concern because 
they are more likely to predict the consequences of permanent migration. But it 
should be kept in mind that, even the recent migrants are not alike. We will come back 
to this later. 
It’s also worth noting that, the processes of permanent migration are selective. 
Those with high level of education, high income level, high ability or those locating in 
the suburban area are more likely to be selected (or self select) to get urban hukou. 
This process of selection can happen either at rural origins or at urban destination. It’s 
possible that people first choose to migrate without urban hukou, and successfully get 
urban hukou later. Therefore, the distinction between permanent migrants and 
temporary migrants are not clear-cut, especially when there’re a large proportion of 
permanent migrants who didn’t report how they get urban hukou. This shortcoming is 
not fatal however. First, a large proportion of permanent migrants get urban hukou 
through education, joining army, etc. In these cases, the decision is probably made 
before they migrate. Second, it is extremely difficult for temporary migrants to get 
urban hukou until very recently. For most temporary migrants, if not through 
particular official channels (mentioned above) to go to urban areas, they are doomed 
to keep their rural hukou. Finally, our focus in this paper is to see the self-selection 
effect of permanent migrants and temporary migrants. Our conclusions are not 
conditional on when and where did the migrants get urban hukou.11 
                                                        
10 We choose 1992 because the 14th CCPC take place in this year. “Establishing socialist market economy” is set 
up the goal of China’s economic reform.  
11 For example, people may only select to migrant and some exogenous factors (such as luck) decide whether they 
can successful get an urban hukou. If this is the case, permanent migrants’ counterfactual income distribution will 
be identical to that of temporary migrants (see the methodological part). We thank the referee for raising this point. 
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3.3 Rural residents, urban residents, and migrants 
Characteristics  
In the following analysis, we keep individuals aged 18 to 60. Those in school are also 
dropped. The shares of rural and urban sample remain almost unchanged. In order to 
avoid the endogeneity problem of education, we also dropped permanent migrants 
who obtained their urban hukou under the age of 16. Next, we compare four 
subsamples, with the first two (the urban natives and permanent migrants) having 
urban hukou and the last two (rural residents and temporary migrants in the urban 
survey)12 having rural hukou.  
    Table 2 reports the simple statistics for men. We compare the urban natives and the 
rural residents at first. These two groups are distinct in almost every aspects we 
considered, from education level to labor participation. First, the urban natives are 
more educated than rural residents, with the average years of schooling being 11.1 and 
7.8, respectively. As for education levels, more than half of the rural residents only 
have middle school education, and nearly one quarter of the population have only 
primary (or below) education. In contrast, nearly 70% of the urban residents have 
above high school (inclusive) education. The fraction of population with below 
primary (inclusive) education is only 3%. In terms of age, ethnicity, and political 
status, the urban natives are older than the rural residents, and they are less likely to 
be minorities, and more likely to have party membership. Finally, we calculate the 
shares of people who have wage income in 2002, and we use these as a crude 
indicator of labor participation. For urban natives, the share is around 81%, while for 
rural residents, it is only 54%.  
Although permanent migrants are similar to urban natives, and type I migrants 
are similar to rural residents, there are dissimilarities. As for type I migrants, they are 
slightly more educated than rural residents, and they are younger. They have a lower 
share of party memberships (5% as opposed to 13% for rural residents), and a much 
higher labor participation rate (95% as opposed to 54% for rural residents). For the 
permanent migrants, the fraction of the sample with above college education is more 
than 40%, which is even much higher than that of urban natives (29%). Similarly, the 
share of party members for the permanent migrant sample is also much higher than 
                                                        
12 The rural residents also include some temporary migrants (type II migrants). We’ll separate it out in the 
following analysis. 
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that for the native sample. The dissimilarities are to a larger extent when compare the 
permanent migrants with rural residents. All these indicate that permanent migrants 
are positively selected, and the selection effect is larger than type I migrants.   
(Insert table 2a and 2b around here) 
Table 2b reports the statistics for female. The contrasts between rural residents and 
urban residents are similar. Urban female residents have higher levels of education, 
they are less likely to be minorities, and more likely to be party members and wage 
earners. When compare to men, the statistics are consistent with most of the literature 
and with our casual observation. Female not only have lower level of education than 
men, but also have lower labor participation rate both in political and economic 
activities. This is true for both rural and urban residents, but varies in extent. The 
gender gap seems to be larger in rural areas than in urban areas. Within the urban 
residents, however, the differential patterns between natives and migrants female are 
not similar to those of males. Both the migrants’ education level and labor 
participation rate are slightly lower than their urban native counterparts, and their 
likelihood of being party members are almost the same as natives.  
It’s obvious that labor participation rates as defined by the shares of wage earners 
vary considerably among different samples. In the following part, we rely heavily on 
the sample of wage earners. When we come to rural wage earners in the rural 
household survey, we can divide them further into two subgroups, local wage earners 
and temporary migrants (type II migrants). In Table 3a and Table 3b, we give 
summary statistics for wage earners for male and female respectively. Generally 
speaking, wage earners have slightly higher level of education than the whole sample, 
and this is especially true for female. And the contrasts between urban residents and 
rural residents, between urban natives and permanent migrants, and between male and 
female are similar to what we have discussed for all residents. As the labor 
participation rate is relatively high for urban residents and type I migrants, the 
statistics for wage earners are very similar to those in Table 2a and Table 2b. Therefore, 
we compare mainly two subgroups of wage earners, namely type II temporary 
migrants and rural local wage earners.  
(Insert table 3a and 3b around here) 
As for education, it’s clear that type II migrants have more years of schooling on 
average for both male and female, but only marginally. When we break down the 
years of schooling into four education levels, majority of the wage earners are junior 
middle school graduates. The fraction, however, is much higher for type II migrant 
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workers than for local wage earners (0.63 and 0.54 respectively for men, 0.60 and 
0.45 respectively for female). As for other levels of education, rural local wage 
earners have both larger share of primary education and larger share of high school 
graduates.  
As for age, the male (female) type II migrants are 32 (26) years old on average, 
almost 10 year younger than their counterparts of local wage earners. It’s also clear 
that female wage earners are much younger than their male counterparts on average. 
This is consistent with most of the literature. As for party membership, the fraction is 
much higher for local wage earners than for temporary migrants. And this is true for 
both genders. 
We also calculate the working days per year and working hours per day for all 
the subgroups. Urban residents, both natives and migrants have more days of working 
than rural local wage earners and type II migrants, but less than type I migrants. And 
the rural local wage earners have the least working days. As for working hours per day, 
the temporary migrants, especially type I, work most.  
The last thing we want to mention in this subsection is that, permanent migrants 
and temporary migrants are very distinct in almost every aspect. The previous 
research that emphasizes only the latter may bias our understanding. Next, we turn to 
the differentials of their economic outcomes (hour wages and per capita income). 
Income distribution and income differentials  
Figure 1gives the hour wage densities for rural local workers, urban native workers, 
and three types of migrants (upper-left and upper-middle panels for male and female 
respectively). It’s clear that urban workers have much higher level of wages than rural 
local workers. The three types of migrants have very different wage distributions. For 
type I migrants, although they are sampled from the same areas as urban workers, 
their wage distribution is very close to that of rural but not urban workers. Type II 
migrants have even lower wage levels than rural workers. On the contrary, the wage 
distribution of permanent migrants almost overlaps with that of urban natives workers. 
All these indicate remarkable heterogeneity among different types of migrants. Even 
within permanent migrants, there is obvious heterogeneity. As is shown by the lower 
two panels of Figure 1, permanent migrants of different migration cohorts have very 
different wage distributions. The more recent migrants not only have lower wage 
levels, but have more wage dispersions. The above descriptions are true both for male 
and female.  
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Of course, the above description may be problematic, because wage earners are 
only parts of the whole labor force and there is larger proportion of the labor force 
that did not have wage income in rural areas. Thus wage density cannot fully reflect 
the rural-urban income gap. To overcome this, we use per capita annual income 
densities instead of those of wages (see upper-right panel of Figure 1). 13 The patterns 
are similar. One noteworthy dissimilarity is the distribution for type I migrants. It’s 
more close to that of urban residents and permanent migrants instead of rural residents. 
This is partly because type I migrants have large number of working days and long 
working hours per day. 
(Insert Figure 1 around here) 
We also calculate the means and various measures of inequality for per capita 
income of different groups (see Table 4). The first row of Table 4 reports average per 
capita incomes for various groups. The first two columns are for rural residents and 
urban residents. It’s straightforward to calculate the urban-rural income ratio, which is 
3.01:1 (8174:2715). The urban residents are composed of two parts: urban natives and 
permanent migrants. The average incomes of these two subgroups are 8290 and 7678 
Yuan. One group that is neither included as rural residents, nor as urban residents is 
type I migrant. Their average income is 6552 Yuan. The following rows report various 
inequality measures. The rural residents have the highest level of inequality, Gini 
coefficient being 0.3683. The type I migrants have the second highest Gini coefficient, 
0.3484. The Gini coefficient for urban residents and for urban natives and permanent 
migrants are similar and are among the lowest (less than 0.33).  
What would the urban-rural income gap and the income distributions would be 
like if there were not migrants? One simple but also naïve exercise is to separate the 
migrants samples from the urban residents sample, merge them with rural residents, 
and recalculate various inequality measures directly. The results are reported in 
columns 6, 7, and 8 in Table 4. As both type I migrants and permanent migrants have 
higher levels of per capita income than rural residents, it’s not surprising to see that 
both rural income levels and inequality measures increase.  
We call this exercise naïve because the rural residents, urban residents, and 
migrants face different skill prices. If migrants didn’t migrate, they would not have 
                                                        
13 In the 2002 urban survey, each working individual is asked “what’s your total income in 2002?” The income 
can take various forms including basic wages, bonus, subsidies, ect. We sum all the incomes within a household 
and divide it by total numbers of individuals. The income data for rural households are more straightforward. They 
were asked what’s their net income in 2002 on household basis, we divide the net income by family size to get the 
per capita income. 
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income levels as they are having as migrants. Therefore, we need to answer one basic 
question: what would the income distribution have been like if migrants were paid as 
in rural areas or as rural residents. We’ll come back to Table 4 in section 5. 
(Insert table 4 around here) 
4. Constructing Counterfactual Income Distribution  
In order to construct the counterfactual income distribution, we first discuss the 
methodology and then give the empirical results. 
4.1 Methodology14 
Let ( )|if w x  be the density of income w  in region i , conditional on a set of 
observed characteristics x . i takes two possible values, Rural and Urban. Therefore, 
differences in ( )|Ruralf w x  and ( )|Urbanf w x  capture differences in skill prices in 
the two areas. One way to see the difference is to estimate wage (income) equations 
for various subgroups. From Table A 2 in the appendix, we can see that urban residents 
(both natives and permanent migrants) have higher returns to education than rural 
residents and temporary migrants. The returns to experience, political status, and 
ethnicity status are also different.15 Next, we define ( )|h x i Rural= as the density of 
observed characteristics of individuals in rural areas, and ( )|h x i Urban= as the 
density of observed characteristics among migrants in urban areas. Differences in 
( )|h x i Rural=  and ( )|h x i Urban=  capture differences in the distributions of 
observed characteristics for migrant workers and for rural stayers. The observed 
density of income for individuals working in rural area is 
( ) ( ) ( )| | |Ruralg w i Rural f w x h x i Rural dx= = =∫  
Likewise, the observed density of income for migrants is 
( ) ( ) ( )| | |Urbang w i Urban f w x h x i Urban dx= = =∫  
                                                        
14 The following part borrows heavily from Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux’s (1996) and Chiquiar and Hanson 
(2002). 
15 A more complete description of the conditional distribution is to estimate quantile regressions. But this is not 
indispensible for the DFL approach. We think OLS estimation of wage equations is sufficient to illustrate that the 
skill prices are different between urban and rural areas. 
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Consider the density of wages that would prevail for migrant workers in urban 
areas if they were paid according to the prices of skills in rural areas: 
( ) ( ) ( )| |Rural RuralUrbang w f w x h x i Urban dx= =∫  
This corresponds to the distribution of wages for rural stayers, except that it is 
integrated over the skill distribution for migrants in urban areas. While this 
distribution is unobserved, we can rewrite it as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
|
| |
|
              | |
Rural Rural
Urban
Rural
h x i Rural
g w f w x h x i Urban dx
h x i Rural
f w x h x i Rural dxθ
== = =
= =
∫
∫
 
where 
( )
( )
|
|
h x i Urban
h x i Rural
θ == =  
The key insight of Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux’s (1996) is that a counterfactual 
density can be estimated by taking an observed density (e.g. for individuals in rural 
areas (stayers)) and re-weighting it (e.g., to reflect the distribution of characteristics of 
rural migrant workers). To compute the weight, use Bayes’s Law to write, 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
| Pr
Pr |
h x i Urban i Urban
h x
i Urban x
= == =  
and 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
| Pr
Pr |
h x i Rural i Rural
h x
i Rural x
= == =  
Combining the above two equations we can obtain an expression for θ  that is a 
function of the ratio of the probability that a rural-born individual works in rural areas 
(conditional on x ) to the probability that a rural-born individual works in urban areas 
(conditional on x ).  
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
| Pr Pr |
| Pr Pr |
M h x i Urban i Rural i Urban x
h x i Rural i Urban i Rural x
θ = = == = ⋅= = =  
Note that the first ratio ( ) ( )Pr Pri Rural i Urban= = is a constant given by the sample 
proportions of rural migrants and rural stayers. The second needs to be estimated, and 
Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux’s (1996) suggest estimating these probabilities 
parametrically, using the estimates to calculateθ , and then applying the estimatedθ s 
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to standard kernel density estimators to obtain a counterfactual income density: 
( )
1
ˆ
ˆ
n
j j
j
w W
g w K
h h
θ
=
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ .  
Therefore, by using the income data of rural local workers and the predicted values 
ofθ , we can have the counterfactual income densities of migrant workers. And it’s 
straight forward to calculate the counterfactual income inequalities (as we already 
pointed out in the literature section). Suppose the share of permanent migrants and 
rural residents are s and (1-s), and suppose all the estimated θˆ s for rural residents 
sum up to 1.16 Then the counterfactual Gini coefficient can be estimated normally 
using the reweighted sample of rural residents. The weight for each observation j 
is ( ) ˆ1 / js N s θ− + ⋅ , where N refers to the number of observations of rural residents.  
Before going to the empirical results part, we make two clarifications here. First, 
the income w can take various forms. Our first choice is log of hourly wages. But not 
everyone has wages, and those who have wages are not randomly drawn from the 
whole population. Therefore we can also think of w as per capita income at the 
household level. We do carry out some exercises in the following part by using per 
capita income to circumvent the sample selection issue of using wage data. At the 
moment, we just ignore the labor participation issue for simplicity, and we’ll come 
back to this issue at the later part of this subsection. Second, the definition of region i 
is also worth more clarification. The two values (Rural and Urban) have different 
interpretations in different exercises. When we are using wage data, Rural refers to 
rural local workers, and Urban refers to different types of migrants such as permanent 
migrants or the two types of temporary migrants. This means that while we are 
studying the selection nature of different migrant samples, the sample of rural local 
workers is always being used as the reference group. When we are using per capita 
income, Rural refers to all labor force of rural residents in the rural household survey. 
The type II migrants are also included in this reference group because they also 
contribute to their rural household income. Therefore, Urban only refers to permanent 
migrants or type I temporary migrants. 
                                                        
16 All the estimated θˆ s for rural residents do not necessarily sum up to 1. If not, we should first do some 
adjustment before using ( ) ˆ1 / js N s θ− + ⋅ as weight. And when there are more than two groups, the extension is 
straight forward.  
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4.2 Basic Empirical Results 
We apply the above method to our combined sample of rural local workers and 
permanent migrants first. To construct the counterfactual wage densities for 
permanent migrants, we estimate a logit model for ( )Pr |i Rural x=  using this 
combined sample. The predicted probability can be used to calculate the weight, 
( ) ( )1 Pr | / Pr |i Rural x i Rural x− = =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . This can in turn be used to construct the 
counterfactual wage densities of permanent migrants. The variables we use include 
years of schooling, experience, experience squared, minority dummy, and party 
membership dummy. We report the predicted probability of being rural residents by 
gender, by party membership, by age, and by education in Figure 2. Clearly, education 
plays a very important role. For those with junior middle school education and below, 
the probability of permanent migration is almost negligible. This is especially true for 
the young and for males. Those with above college (inclusive) education have the 
highest probability of permanent migration. And this probability increases with age. 
Besides, party members have higher probability of permanent migration, female also 
have higher probability of permanent migration when holding others variables (age, 
party membership, education, etc) constant. 
(Insert figure 2 here) 
The most important empirical results of this paper are reported in Figure 3 for 
male (upper panels) and female (lower panels) respectively. The dark solid lines in the 
left and middle panels of Figure 3 are the estimated kernel wage densities of permanent 
migrants (left panel) and rural local workers (middle panel) respectively. The two 
dashed lines in the two panels for each gender are identical in fact. They’re the 
counterfactual kernel densities for permanent migrants, assuming they are paid 
according rural skill prices. All these above estimates are based on a Gaussian kernel 
function, and the number of bins is set at 200.  
It’s clear that, the counterfactual wage densities for permanent migrants drift to 
the left to its actual densities. This is consistent with the fact that the skill prices are 
relatively lower in rural areas (or for rural residents). However, even permanent 
migrants were paid according to rural skill prices, the counterfactual wage densities 
and the actual wage densities of rural residents are far from close (see the upper 
middle panel). This means that permanent migrants are drawn from the rural residents 
disproportionately. For wages up to somewhere slightly over the peak of rural 
residents’ wage density, the counterfactual wage density exhibits a smaller mass, and 
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it exhibits a larger mass after that point. It is not until the extremely high wages are 
reached that the two densities coincide, and for high levels of wages, the 
counterfactual density of permanent migrants seldom has smaller mass than the actual 
density of rural residents.  
(Insert figure 3 here) 
For convenience of comparison, the difference between the wage densities of 
rural residents and the counterfactual wage densities of permanent migrants is shown 
in the right panel. It appears that the people with the highest probability of becoming 
urban residents would have above-medium wages in rural areas, and those with the 
least probability would have medium-to-low wages. Were permanent migrant male in 
urban areas to return to rural areas and be paid according to rural skill prices, they 
would tend to fall disproportionately in the upper half of rural wage distribution. All 
these results are consistent with the hypothesis of “positive selection”. This 
conclusion also applies to female. It appears that the discrepancy between the actual 
density of rural female residents and the counterfactual density of female permanent 
migrants are even larger than that for males. 
All these results suggest that migration to urban areas permanently, by taking 
mass away from upper half of rural wage distribution, may reduce wage inequality in 
rural areas and increase income gap between rural and urban areas. 
4.3 Robustness Check 
By Age Cohorts and by Migration Cohorts 
For robustness check, and to account for the fact that China experienced dramatic 
transition and development, we carry out several other exercises. One natural exercise 
is to divide the combined sample by age group. We have three age cohorts both for 
male and female, namely 18-30, 31-45, and 46-60. Figure 4 report the results. Instead 
of reporting the actual densities of rural residents and counterfactual densities of 
permanent migrants, we just report their differences. Before going into details, one 
conclusion can be made in advance. If the permanent migrants returned to rural areas 
and be paid as rural residents, their wages will fall disproportionately in the upper 
portion of rural income distribution. The interesting aspect is that the extent of 
disproportion varies with age.  
We see the results for male first. From upper-left panel of Figure 4, we can see 
that the counterfactual densities for permanent migrants become more and more 
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closer to the actual wage densities for rural residents as the age increases. This means 
that for above-medium values in the residents’ actual wage distribution, the mass of 
counterfactual density are larger than that of rural actual density to a larger extent for 
younger cohort than for older cohort. And for middle and lower wage values, the 
actual densities are above the counterfactual density to a larger extent for younger 
cohort also. As for female (upper-right panel), such trend is not as clear as for men, 
but this may be caused by the fact that the samples for female become very small.  
The results for the current young cohorts are more supportive of the positive 
selection (at least that of men). This is consistent with the fact that the young 
individuals in the permanent migrant sample are mainly composed of those obtaining 
their urban hukou by education, while those older include not only those obtaining 
their urban hukou through education long before but those through buying house 
and/or “losing land”. We can also interpret the results as that the positive selection 
effect disappears as people age. As these two explanations have distinct policy 
implications, we do the following exercise to determine which one is more feasible.  
(Insert figure 4 here) 
As we have mentioned in the previous sections, the process of permanent 
migration is influenced by different institutional factors in different time of periods. 
Another exercise we therefore carry out is to divide the sample into four “migration 
cohorts”, namely those who obtained their urban hukou before 1978, those between 
year 1979 to 1992, those between 1993 and 2002, and those between 1998 and 2002. 
We investigate these four cohorts because 1978, 1992, and 1997 are three critical 
years in China’s transitional process. It’s clear that, positive selections remain obvious 
as the counterfactual densities are still above the actual densities for upper portions of 
wage distribution, and below for middle and lower portions (see lower panels in Figure 
4). However, the positive selection effects seem to be more obvious for the 1978-1992 
migration cohorts both for male and for female, because the distances between the 
zero horizontal line and the difference lines are the largest for these cohorts at most of 
the wage values (except for the -1978 cohorts). The difference lines for the 1993-2002, 
and 1998-2002 cohorts lie between those for the 1979-1992 cohorts and the zero line. 
The difference lines for the 1998-2002 cohorts are very close to the zero line in fact, 
indicating that the actual wage densities for rural residents are very close to the 
counterfactuals (especially for men).  
All the results may indicate that, with the deepening of Chinese labor market 
reform, the process of permanent migration is becoming less and less selective. Of 
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course, this may also be due to the fact that during the later period, many rural 
residents’ lands are occupied and therefore they obtained their urban hukou. Such 
kind of permanent migration processes are neither based on personal characteristics 
such as education level, nor based on socioeconomic status such as income or wealth 
level, but simply because they reside near city.  
Accounting for Labor Participation Differentials 
One major drawback of the above analysis is the neglect of the differentials in 
labor participation rates between urban residents and rural residents. In this subsection, 
we adopt the approach proposed by Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) to account for the 
fact that labor participation rates in rural and urban areas are very different from each 
other. The counterfactual density can be estimated by first taking the observed density 
for rural wage earners, and then reweighting it to reflect the not only differences in 
characteristics, but also differences in labor participation rates. Therefore, we need to 
modify our weight as follows: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
Pr , 1 Pr 1| , Pr |
Pr , 1 Pr 1| , Pr |
i iP M
i i
i Rural D D i Urban x i Urban x
i Urban D D i Rural x i Rural x
θ θ θ = = = = == = ⋅ ⋅= = = = =  
iD is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual has wage jobs 
(Yes=1/otherwise=0). The first term in the r.h.s is simply some constant determined 
by the sample, and thus does not matter for our analysis. The last term is exactly what 
we estimated in the previous sections. The new term is in the middle,  
( ) ( )Pr 1| , Pr 1| ,P i iD i Urban x D i Rural xθ = = = = =  
This is used to account for the labor participation differentials.17 We estimate 
logit models for Rural sample and Urban sample respectively, and use the predicted 
probabilities to construct ˆPθ  , then we use ˆ ˆ ˆP Mθ θ θ=  as the new weight to get the 
counterfactual wage densities for permanent migrants.  
The results by age cohorts and by migration cohorts are reported in Figure 5. The 
results are still supportive of positive selection. When we compare these results with 
those without considering labor participation, the distances between the difference 
lines and the zero line seem to be smaller. The patterns are still similar, however. As 
for results by age groups for men, the difference line for the 18-30 cohorts is the most 
                                                        
17 For more details, please see Chiquiar and Hanson (2002). 
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distant one to the zero line for large range of the wage values, and the one for 46-60 
cohorts is the closest. The result for female seems similar, but not as clear and clean as 
that for men.  
As for results by migration cohorts, the results for the earlier migration cohorts 
are more supportive of positive selection. The more recent of the year of migration, 
the closer the difference line to the zero line. This is true both for male and female, 
but especially for men. As for the 1997-2002 migration cohorts, the difference line for 
male is very close to the zero line. This means permanent migrants would have very 
similar wage distributions as their counterpart rural stayers if they returned home and 
being paid as rural residents. For female however, and being paid as rural residents. 
For female however, the permanent migration process seems more selective even for 
the 1997-2002 cohorts (see lower-left panel of Figure 5). 
(Insert figure 5 here) 
Endogeneity of Education and Other Considerations 
In order to circumvent the endogeneity problem of education, we drop all the 
individuals older than 16 years when obtaining their urban hukou in the above 
analysis. This practice, however are still not out of question. As have been mentioned 
above, formal education is a major channel through which rural residents get urban 
hukou. What’s more, those who get their urban hukou through education almost 
invariably complete their final education in urban areas. The “positive selection” 
findings above may therefore simply reflect the fact that education is a channel of 
permanent migration. To alleviate this concern, we do another exercise by simply 
dropping the “education” permanent migration category. To avoid the problem of 
sample selection, we restrict this analysis to those aged 25-60. The results for male 
and female are reported in the lower-middle and lower-right panels of Figure 5, 
respectively. The black solid line depicts the difference between the actual rural wage 
distribution and the counterfactual wage densities for permanent migrants for the 
population aged 25-60. The pattern is similar to what we find in previous sections. 
The thick grey line depict the results after we drop the education category of 
permanent migration, the conclusion of “positive selection” is still valid, but to a 
lesser extent. This is true for both male and female. This means that even if there is 
not the formal education, through which rural residents get urban hukou, the process 
of permanent migration is still positive selective.  
Another exercise we carried out is to drop the “losing land” category as well as 
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“education” category. The results are depicted by the dotted lines. They almost 
overlapped with the grey line, which means that our results are not sensitive to the 
exclusion of this category. This result is consistent with the fact that these “permanent 
migrants” obtain their urban hukou not because they self-select to, but forced to leave 
their land.  
4.4 Counterfactual Wage Densities of Temporary Migrants 
In this subsection, we investigate a slightly different but similar question. What would 
the wage distributions for the temporary migrants be like if they do not migrate and 
participate in wage jobs and earn wages as local wage earners. 
The basic results for male and female are in Figure  6. For convenience of 
comparison, we put the three difference lines together, each representing the 
difference between the actual wage densities of rural local workers and the 
counterfactual densities of different types of migrants. One distinct feature is that 
difference lines for both types of temporary migrants are much closer to the zero line 
than that for permanent migrants. Another difference is that, for wages up to some 
point of the whole distribution, the difference line for each type of temporary migrants 
lies below the zero line, and after that point, the difference line lies above the zero line. 
This means that both types of temporary migrants would fall disproportionately in the 
medium-to-lower portion of the rural wage distributions if they stayed home, and 
those local wage earners would fall disproportionately in the medium and upper parts. 
This is supportive of “negative selection” as opposed to “positive selection” in 
previous sections. But as is shown in Figure  6, the negative selection effect of 
temporary migration is not as obvious as the positive selection effects of permanent 
migration, especially for male and for type I temporary migrants. We also report the 
difference lines for both types of temporary migrants by gender and by age cohorts  
(middle and right panels). The results are with more variability and are not consistent. 
What’s consistent is that distances between the difference lines and the zero horizontal 
line are close. 
What we should keep in mind is that, we are using the rural local workers as our 
reference group. As the reference group is not randomly selected from the total rural 
population, the negative selection effect of temporary migration does not necessarily 
mean the temporary migrants are negatively selected from the total rural population. 
The selection effect of permanent migrants also suffers such problem. However, the 
positive selection effect is most probably reinforced as the reference group is also 
positively selected as is clear from the descriptive section.  
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(Insert figure 6 here) 
5. The effects of migration on income distribution 
Now we go back to the question raised in section 3，what would the urban-rural 
income gap and the inequality of rural areas be like if there were not migrants? To 
overcome the shortcoming of using wage data, and for the calculation of inequality 
measures, we use per capita income in this section.  
We first construct the counterfactual densities for migrants, and see their 
selection effects. The reference group is labor force from the rural household survey. 
As type II temporary migrants also contribute to household income and it’s difficult to 
separate them out, they are included in the reference group. The counterfactual 
densities and difference lines for type I migrants and permanent migrants are reported 
in Figure 7, respectively. The results are similar with those in the former sections 
although we use different income measures: the permanent migrants are positively 
selected and there is not obvious self-selection effect for type I temporary migrants. 
(Insert figure 7 here) 
To see the selection effects’ implications for income distributions, we calculate 
the counterfactual income levels and inequality measures. Column 9 of Table 4 
indicates that if permanent migrants returned to rural areas and be paid as rural 
residents, the per capita income of rural areas would increase 4% percent from 2715 
to 2814 Yuan. If type I migrants returned, however, the per capita income level would 
remain unchanged (column 10). If both types of migrants retuned, the income level 
would become 2798 yuan (column 11). As permanent migrants are counted as urban 
residents when calculating factual income levels, we should drop them from the urban 
samples. Because permanent migrants have relative lower per capita income (7678 
yuan) than urban natives, this makes the urban per capita income increase from 8174 
to 8290 yuan. Therefore, if permanent migrants returned, the ratio of urban-rural 
income would fall from 3.01:1 (8174:2715) to 2.95:1 (8290:2814); if type I migrants 
returned, the ratio will not change; and if both types returned, the ratio would become 
2.96:1. The counterfactual gap in terms of absolute value does not decrease however.  
How about the inequality levels of rural areas if migrants returned? Take the Gini 
coefficient for example. If permanent migrants returned, the Gini coefficient would 
increase from 0.3683 to 0.3755; if the type I migrants returned, the Gini coefficient 
would remain unchanged; and if both types returned, the Gini coefficient would also 
increase to 0.3740. Although the counterfactual inequality measures would not change 
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much from the factual ones, the directions of changes are consistent with the selection 
effects of different types of migration.  
6. Conclusions 
As massive rural residents leave their home countryside for better employment, 
migration will have profound effects on income distributions such as rural-urban 
income gap and inequalities within rural or urban areas. The nature of the effects 
depends crucially on who are migrating and their migrating patterns. In this paper, we 
emphasize two facts. First, rural residents are not homogeneous, they self-select to 
migrate or not. Second, there are significant differences between migrants who 
successfully transformed their hukou status (permanent migrants) and those did not 
(temporary migrants). Using three coordinated CHIP data sets in 2002, we find that 
permanent migrants are positively selected from rural population especially in terms 
of education. As permanent migration takes more mass from the upper half of rural 
income density, both rural income level and inequalities decrease, the urban-rural 
income ratio increases at the same time. On the contrary, the selection effect for 
temporary migrants is almost negligible. As a result, it does not have obvious effect 
on rural income level and inequalities.  
The policy implications are clear. Migration does not necessarily equalize 
rural-urban income gap. As more educated rural residents left, the rural areas suffered 
from brain-drain problem. Therefore, we need multi-facet development strategies 
instead of focusing mainly on facilitating migration. To increase living standard of 
those left behind, more public services should be provided, including education, 
training, and social securities.  
However, the above conclusions must be taken with qualifications. To focus on 
self-selection, we de-emphasize several important channels, through which migration 
might influence income distributions. First, when we construct the counterfactual 
income densities, we assume that the conditional density of income does not depend 
on the distribution of attributes. This is a strong assumption. In a general equilibrium 
setting, as the distribution of attributes changes, so do their prices. We simply ignore 
this impact in this paper.18 Remittance is another important channel through which 
                                                        
18 The reasons are two. First, general equilibrium effect is difficult to address. Assuming no general equilibrium 
effect is a common practice in many other researches (Dinardo, et al, 1996, and Chiquiar and Hanson, 2002 for 
example). Second, general equilibrium effect may be not a severe problem. Until recent years, wages of migrant 
workers remained low. This is a strong indication that there’s still surplus of labor in rural areas. With large amount 
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migration has impacts on rural income distribution. Many other researches put 
emphasis on this (see Li, 1999, and Du et al, 2005 for example). We just ignore it here 
because we don’t have remittance data for permanent migrants and because it’s not 
our focus. Another important caveat is that our analysis addresses observable skills, 
only. However, if the correlation between observable skills and unobservable skills is 
positive and sufficiently strong, we expect that our results would apply to migrant 
selection in terms of unobservable skills, as well. Finally, we assume that education is 
predetermined before the migration decision of rural residents. However, the fact that 
higher education increased the probability of migration means that migration may 
have an incentive effect on rural residents’ human capital investment decision. If not 
all those with relatively high level of education succeeded in migrating out, migration 
may have a positive effect on the human capital level of rural areas.19 This possibility 
is now being studied intensively in other countries (see Beine et al. 2001 and Beine et 
al. 2006 for example). Although the ‘Brain-Gain’ story may counter-balance the 
‘Brain-Drain’ story, we don’t know any research in Chinese context yet. We believe 
‘Brain-Gain’ story is worth further research, but it’s not our focus here.  
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Table 1 Using Urban Survey to Identify Permanent Migrants 
Time obtain an 
urban hukou? 
 The Ways Rural Residents Get Urban Hukou (%) 
 
 Education Cadre Join Army Lose Land Buy House Others Missing Total
born urban 16,278  - - - - - - - - 
-1950 133  18.05 8.27 15.79 2.26 9.02 37.59 9.02 100 
1950-60 509  28.29 4.91 13.36 0.59 3.93 40.86 8.06 100 
1960-70 484  18.18 3.93 31.82 1.45 2.27 33.88 8.47 100 
1970-80 839  23.6 4.53 14.18 2.86 1.91 49.7 3.22 100 
1980-90 1,312  33.16 1.45 5.34 8.08 3.96 43.45 4.57 100 
1990- 884  16.52 0.68 2.71 12.44 7.81 53.05 6.79 100 
Missing 193  - - - - - - - - 
Total 20,632  
 
 
Table 2a Summary Statistics, Male (Aged 18-60) 
Urban residents 
Rural residents 
rural migrants 
 (urban survey)Urban natives Migrants  
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Years of schooling 11.14 2.99 11.67 3.46 7.76 2.41 8.32 2.62
By education levela 
Primary and below 0.03 -- 0.05 -- 0.25 -- 0.20  -- 
Middle school 0.29 0.45 0.20 0.40 0.56 0.50  0.56  0.50 
High school 0.39 0.49 0.31 0.46 0.18 0.39  0.21  0.41 
College and above 0.29 0.45 0.44 0.50 0.01 0.12  0.03  0.16 
Age 42.02 10.09 44.02 8.83 38.14 12.01  35.29  8.49 
Minority 0.04 0.21 0.03 0.18 0.13 0.34  0.09  0.28 
Party member 0.29 0.45 0.53 0.50 0.13 0.33  0.05  0.22 
Wage earner 0.81 0.39 0.87 0.33 0.54 0.50  0.95  0.22 
Number of household member 3.19 0.78 3.14 0.76 4.40 1.34  2.77  0.95 
Obs.  5114 1291 12328 1977 
Note: a. “high school” category also includes professional school. 
 
Table 2b Summary Statistics, Female (Aged 18-60) 
Urban residents 
Rural residents 
rural migrants 
 (urban survey)Urban natives Migrants  
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Years of schooling 10.65 3.05 9.90 3.57 6.48 2.89  7.33  2.88 
By education levela 
Primary and below 0.06 -- 0.13 -- 0.45 -- 0.34  -- 
Middle school 0.30 0.46 0.33 0.47 0.43 0.50  0.52  0.50 
High school 0.42 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.10 0.31  0.13  0.33 
College and above 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.40 0.01 0.09  0.02  0.12 
Age 41.54 9.70 42.38 9.44 37.56 11.63  33.80  8.30 
Minority 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.13 0.33  0.09  0.28 
Party member 0.18 0.39 0.18 0.39 0.02 0.15  0.01  0.10 
Wage earner 0.63 0.48 0.62 0.49 0.22 0.41  0.76  0.43 
Number of household member 3.15 0.80 3.22 0.90 4.46 1.34  2.85  0.89 
Obs.  5481 1211 11372 1892 
Note: a. “high school” category also includes professional school. 
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Table 3a Summary Statistics for Wage Earners, Male (Aged 18-60) 
Urban residents Rural residents 
 
Native workers  Migrant workers Local wage earners
Migrants 
(Rural survey)  
Migrants 
 (Urban survey)
Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Years of schooling 11.34 2.96 11.95 3.37 8.00 2.40 8.07 2.23 8.29 2.62
By education levela 
Primary and below 0.02  -- 0.04 -- 0.21 -- 0.18 -- 0.20  --
Middle school 0.27  0.44  0.17 0.38 0.54 0.50 0.63 0.48  0.56  0.50 
High school 0.39  0.49  0.31 0.46 0.23 0.42 0.18 0.38  0.21  0.41 
College and above 0.32  0.47  0.47 0.50 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.11  0.03  0.16 
Age 41.56  9.24  43.07 8.48 40.91 10.43 31.63 9.88  35.27  8.40 
Minority 0.04  0.20  0.03 0.18 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.31  0.09  0.29 
Party member 0.30  0.46  0.54 0.50 0.20 0.40 0.06 0.23  0.05  0.21 
Working days per year 274  49  275 47 168 107 207 97  326  58 
Working hrs per day 8.31  1.50  8.22 1.22 7.75 1.91 8.57 1.50  10.29  2.51 
Obs.  4152 1129 4122 2543 1874 
Note: a. “high school” category also includes professional school. 
 
 
Table 3b Summary Statistics for Wage Earners, Female (Aged 18-60) 
Urban residents Rural residents 
 
Native workers  Migrant workers Local wage earners
Migrants 
(Rural survey)  
Migrants 
 (Urban survey)
Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Years of schooling 11.42 2.78 10.97 3.29 7.60 3.01 7.85 2.42 7.48 2.87
By education levela 
Primary and below 0.02  -- 0.05 -- 0.31 -- 0.25 -- 0.32  --
Middle school 0.21  0.41  0.26 0.44 0.45 0.50 0.60 0.49  0.52  0.50 
High school 0.46  0.50  0.40 0.49 0.21 0.41 0.13 0.34  0.14  0.34 
College and above 0.30  0.46  0.29 0.45 0.02 0.16 0.01 0.11  0.02  0.13 
Age 38.99  8.43  39.19 7.95 35.88 10.20 25.53 7.75  33.46  7.90 
Minority 0.04  0.20  0.05 0.22 0.04 0.19 0.09 0.28  0.08  0.27 
Party member 0.21  0.40  0.22 0.41 0.07 0.26 0.01 0.10  0.01  0.11 
Working days per year 271  52  276 51 189 111 237 91  327  60 
Working hrs per day 8.06  1.30  8.23 1.63 7.85 1.78 8.47 1.43  10.34  2.41 
Obs.  3455 748 1378 1072 1432 
Note: a. “high school” category also includes professional school. 
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Table 4 Income Distribution (Per Capita Income) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
  Rural residents Urban residents Urban natives Type III migrants Type I migrants (1)+(4) (1)+(5) (1)+(4)+(5) (1)+(4) (1)+(5) (1)+(4)+(5) 
            Naïve recalculation Reweighting calculation 
Mean (yuan/year) 2715 8174 8290 7678 6552 3196 3248 3623 2814 2712 2798 
Inequality measures 
relative mean deviation 0.2624 0.2328 0.2335 0.2289 0.2458 0.2985 0.2946 0.3112 0.2677 0.2619 0.2666 
coefficient of variation 0.8379 0.6756 0.6717 0.6892 0.9155 0.9664 1.031 1.0384 0.8693 0.836 0.8642 
standard deviation of logs 0.6801 0.6082 0.6088 0.6021 0.6178 0.7465 0.7414 0.7785 0.6896 0.6793 0.6877 
Gini coefficient 0.3683 0.3278 0.328 0.3245 0.3484 0.4127 0.4086 0.4275 0.3755 0.3676 0.3740 
Mehran measure 0.4876 0.4442 0.4445 0.4406 0.4593 0.5349 0.5315 0.5541 0.4948 0.4869 0.4933 
Piesch measure 0.3086 0.2696 0.2698 0.2664 0.2929 0.3517 0.3472 0.3642 0.3158 0.3079 0.3144 
Kakwani measure 0.1195 0.0957 0.0957 0.0944 0.1093 0.1473 0.1447 0.1569 0.1239 0.1191 0.1231 
Theil entropy measure 0.2441 0.1832 0.1827 0.1832 0.2382 0.3088 0.31 0.3323 0.2563 0.2432 0.2541 
Theil mean log deviation measure 0.2336 0.1827 0.1827 0.1803 0.2079 0.2907 0.2869 0.3142 0.2427 0.2328 0.2409 
Entropy measure GE -1 0.3213 0.2304 0.2314 0.2232 0.2455 0.4022 0.3973 0.445 0.333 0.3202 0.3307 
Note:  (1) Rural residents of column one include temporary migrants in rural survey (type II migrants) but not migrants in urban survey (type I migrants); (2) Urban residents include permanent migrants 
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Figure 1 Wage (Income) Distributions 
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Figure 2 Predicted Probability of Being Rural Residents 
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Figure 3 Counterfactual Wage Densities for Permanent Migrants 
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Figure 4 Differences between rural factual and counterfactual densities by age and by year of migration 
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Figure 5 Robustness Check 
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Figure 6 Differences between factual and counterfactual densities 
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Figure 7 Counterfactual Densities of Per Capita Income for Permanent Migrants (upper) and Type I 
Migrants (lower) 
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  Appendix 
Table A 1a Summary Statistics for Permanent Migrants 
  How did you obtain your urban hukou? 
Variable Education Cadre Army Land House Others 
Age obtaining hukou 19.51  21.48  22.30  25.28  24.40  21.83  
 (5.52)  (6.98)  (7.05)  (12.07) (13.47)  (11.17)  
Years of schooling 13.40  10.70  10.20  8.40  8.81  8.82  
  (2.78)  (3.37)  (3.50)  (3.29)  (3.88)  (3.73)  
Age  42.87  53.65  53.01  39.86  44.17  43.22  
  (13.06)  (12.09)  (11.16)  (13.87) (17.78)  (15.73)  
Gender  0.39  0.40  0.05  0.61  0.59  0.61  
 (0.49)  (0.49)  (0.22)  (0.49)  (0.49)  (0.49)  
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
 
Table A 1b Summary Statistics for Permanent Migrants 
  When did you obtain your urban hukou? 
 -1950 1950-60 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990- 
Age obtaining hukou 17.22  17.52  18.56  21.30  22.09  23.26  
 (8.53)  (7.09)  (7.56)  (7.68)  (10.32)  (13.05) 
Years of schooling 7.41  8.74  10.20  10.62  11.36  9.29  
  (4.46)  (4.26)  (3.78)  (3.62)  (3.68)  (4.01)  
Age  69.41  63.62  54.05  46.71  38.47  30.40  
  (8.54)  (7.46)  (7.85)  (7.97)  (10.61)  (13.23) 
Gender  0.35  0.44  0.31  0.40  0.51  0.62  
  (0.48)  (0.50)  (0.47)  (0.49)  (0.50)  (0.49)  
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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Table A 2a OLS Wage Regressions, Male 
Urban residents  Rural residents 
Natives Migrants 
 Local  
wage earners 
migrants in  
rural survey 
migrants in  
urban survey  
Years of schooling 0.084*** 0.059*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.045***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
Experience 0.030*** 0.008 0.029*** 0.048*** 0.024*** 
(0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Experience sqrd/100 -0.032*** -0.013 -0.049*** -0.071*** -0.050*** 
(0.008) (0.019) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) 
Minority  -0.058 0.014 0.011 -0.017 0.059 
(0.047) (0.100) (0.060) (0.059) (0.057) 
Party member 0.152*** 0.205*** 0.166*** -0.052 0.045 
(0.022) (0.038) (0.034) (0.065) (0.075) 
Migrant cohort 
1961-70 -0.476**
(0.198)
1971-80 -0.446**
(0.202)
1981-90 -0.528**
(0.206)
1990- -0.637***
(0.212)
Constant 0.541*** 1.826*** 0.620*** 0.209 0.615*** 
(0.074) (0.298) (0.117) (0.161) (0.131) 
R-squared 0.266 0.253 0.094 0.220 0.095 
N 4152 1129 4122 2543 1874 
Note: 1). Region dummies are controlled. 2). “Migrant cohort” refers to when the migrants obtain his/her urban hukou. 3). Standard errors 
in parentheses. 4). *significant at 10% level, **significant 5%level, ***significant at 1% level. 
Table A 2b OLS Wage Regressions, Female 
Urban residents  Rural residents 
Natives Migrants 
 Local  
wage earners 
migrants in  
rural survey 
migrants in  
urban survey  
Years of schooling 0.109*** 0.077*** 0.025*** 0.026** 0.042*** 
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) 
Experience 0.026*** 0.029** 0.013** 0.007 0.021*** 
(0.004) (0.012) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) 
Experience sqrd/100 -0.020* -0.067*** -0.015 0.009 -0.051*** 
(0.011) (0.025) (0.013) (0.022) (0.013) 
Minority  -0.012 0.008 -0.266** -0.125 -0.018 
(0.057) (0.117) (0.134) (0.097) (0.060) 
Party member 0.135*** 0.131** 0.319*** 0.624*** 0.201 
(0.029) (0.060) (0.079) (0.223) (0.138) 
Migrant cohort 
1971-80 0.080
(0.169)
1981-90 -0.072
(0.169)
1990- -0.228
(0.177)
Constant 0.159* 0.817** 0.478*** 0.095 0.409*** 
(0.091) (0.347) (0.148) (0.278) (0.124) 
R-squared 0.295 0.253 0.131 0.268 0.126 
N 3455 748 1378 1072 1432 
Note: 1). Region dummies are controlled. 2). “Migrant cohort” refers to when the migrants obtain his/her urban hukou. 3). Standard errors 
in parentheses. 4). *significant at 10% level, **significant 5%level, ***significant at 1% level. 
